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They were not interested in abstractions to any great extent. A friend who has worked among the Jackies at the Great Lakes station tells me that those boys asked him the most impossible theological questions. He showed me a list of ten such that he had taken down. They would perplex a theological faculty. I suspect that this is partially due to the fact that the Jackie averages around twenty years of age, while our draft men were nearer twenty-six.

The religious work in a cantonment is very different from that which is either possible or desirable in the camps overseas. In the cantonment men are

getting ready for a great strain. They are eager to meet it like men. The natural heroism of the soul is steadily stiffening to an entire readiness to make the great sacrifice, and as time goes on and the contest grows nearer, religion seems to come down to its simplest personal elements—a mighty belief in the God of right and justice, and a more or less confident faith that he who gave his own son to die that others might live will deal kindly with a man who knows that he is weak and wants spiritual strength to keep clean and fight bravely, and, if need be, die in hope of immortal life beyond.

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## RELIGION AND WAR

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Patriotism is indissolubly connected with war. Indeed, it is commonly most in evidence during times of war. Yet it is only a few years since war for America was a matter of hardly more than academic importance. We had peace societies, several of them heavily endowed, but their chief operation seemed rather dealing with anachronistic issues. We were altogether unmilitary as a nation, and as a nation the United States looked out upon war as something which might be expected in remote and backward regions like Africa, or in such turbulent and unmodern states as those which are to be found in the

Balkans. We had even come to believe the peristent assertion that the Kaiser was the guardian of the peace of Europe. Few Americans were interested in international affairs, and even our relation with the dangerous Morocco question was that of benevolent aloofness. Our hopes were centered around the Hague Conference, and we had come to feel that the ever-increasing intimacy and interdependence born of commerce and the growing co-operation in the field of science—in a word that the whole course of civilization could be trusted to make wars cease. Peace was discussed in the genial atmosphere of banquets, and

pacifism in its more intelligent moments seemed destined to discover some moral equivalent for war.

It is easy now to see that we were not only overcomplacent, but that we were being led astray by an active propaganda conducted by those who wished to keep us in a state of military unpreparedness in the interest of their own programs and policies. Most of us did not see this in 1914. The outbreak of the war found us as unprepared in spirit as in all other particulars. In a way this national attitude was to our credit. We were living like a gentleman with the world, and we refused to believe that any civilized nation was less a gentleman than ourselves. It was not strange, therefore, that the shock of conflict was as great in the field of our spiritual interests as on the fields of France. The first horrors of the war left us not only bewildered but in distress of soul. Failing to understand the causes which had brought about the hostilities, many of us seriously protested that not only civilization but Christianity itself had collapsed. So accustomed had we become to mistaking what ought to be for what really is that we were in all but mental and moral chaos.

Our first reaction was to reaffirm our faith in the supremacy of moral ideals. We could not believe the stories of atrocities which came to us with increasing volume. The crime against Belgium seemed to belong to the people of another world. Our attitude of mind was not exactly ostrich-like, but it was the attitude of those whose spiritual eyesight had been so accustomed to the mist of idealism as to be

untrustworthy in the light of reality. Religious leaders reasserted with new emphasis the ideals of Jesus, and we believed that Christianity demanded, if not actual nonresistance, both a political neutrality and a detached moral attitude as well. As Americans we felt that the war was born of conditions of such thoroughly continental pedigree as to make the war strictly European. Whatever may have been our personal sympathies, we demanded peace and determined to avoid every act and expression that threatened peace. Christianity we felt was opposed to war, and the choice between war and Christianity seemed absolute.

But I do not need to dwell upon the bitterness of the awakening. Our eyes were gradually cleared to see the real meaning of the war. At last we were forced to realize that whatever may have been the occasions of the conflict, its fundamental causes involved us as truly as any other nation. And with this awakening came fundamental questions which continue to present themselves, much to the disturbance of those souls which dislike to look at humanity as it is; for these fundamental questions focus in the challenge war makes to religion.

## I

The conventional opinion of the relation of religion and war is that of antagonism. The awfulness of the one and the hopes of the other, once set over against each other, appear irreconcilable. It follows that the conventional opinion is apt to hold that the spread of religion would develop such hostility to war as to make universal peace a certainty.

But unfortunately the actual facts of human experience do not justify this opinion. Before it could be true, conceptions of religion which have been dominant must needs be materially changed. As a matter of fact, none of the great religions has been in practice frankly antimilitaristic. As a rule religion has always been a supporter of the warrior and has never been filled with a moral power sufficient to make war impossible.

It needs no argument to show that ancient religions were militaristic. Jahweh of the Hebrews was the God of battles who taught his followers the use of the bow and the chariot, and who was expected to fight with his people's armies. There are no more terrible stories in history than those which describe the treatment of the Canaanites by the followers of Jahweh. But in this the Hebrew religion was at one with other religions. Polytheism always had its god of war or its goddess of savagery, and one of the chief duties of the representative of religion was to prepare his people for war.

This is, of course, only to say that religion has partaken of the general ethical quality of the times in which its followers have lived. The history of humanity is a succession of bloody struggles. The moral content of religion has been drawn from contemporaneous ethical ideals, and these have not been so organized as to raise the question of the justice of war as an expression of the fighting instinct of the race.

When one looks for the causes of wars he finds religion oftentimes among the most potent. Mohammedanism has notoriously been a military religion, but

it would not be safe to say in this particular that it has been any more pronouncedly militaristic than Christianity itself with its crusades and wars of religion.

This fact, when once analyzed, is seen to mean that religions have always failed to deal directly with the fundamental causes of wars. It goes without saying that unless the crises which have led to wars shall in the future be dominated by moral vision and idealism sufficient to bring about international adjustments through arbitration and mutual compromise, wars are inevitable.

To make this thesis more intelligible, let us ask the question: From what motives have wars sprung?

The wars of the ancient world were in most cases those of unashamed desire for conquest. That this desire had its unrecognized origins may be true. Those who see only economic determinism in human affairs posit for all social action some economic force which in turn rests on geographical foundations. And there is, of course, a large element of truth in such a contention. If we recall the turbulent course of history in the Western world, it is easy to see that the desire to trade with or to control the trade of other nations has led to war. Commercial expansion can be discovered in the struggles between the Greek cities inaugurated by Pericles. Doubtless, if we were better informed as to the century-long conflict waged between the nations of the Nile and the Mesopotamian valleys, similar causes might be found at work there. But in the consciousness of these ancient states such economic motives were secondary to the primary desire of conquest. For

conquest brought booty and slaves and tribute. To fight was the one way of expanding the income and the territory of the state. As one traces the rise of the ancient empires the conviction grows that the ambition for mastery led to vast wars of conquest. Powerful nations like Egypt and Assyria wished to subdue the land that lay between them and ultimately one another. These ancient wars fill the pages of the Old Testament. The Hebrew invaders of Canaan were primarily conquerors, who by force of arms took over a land flowing with milk and honey. The ruthless armies which swept down from the north and up from the south were primarily concerned in the building up of huge empires, within which there should be subject-cities and people. There is little evidence that Assyria or Egypt sought to control foreign markets, for commerce had not reached the development of modern times. The world was not industrial. The forces of production were very partially developed, and war sprang from primitive instincts rather than from economic policy.

The same is true of the wars between Persia and Greece. Persia wanted to expand her power and rule the world. Greece refused to be submerged, and the Persian wars, which forever put an end to Persian ambitions and delivered Greece from fear of the Orient, were due to no clearly discoverable commercial policy on the part of either of the two parties. Alexander, it is true, had Napoleonic plans for world-empire but died before he had transformed his newly acquired divinity into economic policy.

Similarly when Rome fought for supremacy in the Mediterranean basin.

Its one great rival, Carthage, was a commercial city, but Rome had no commerce to be protected or extended. The issue was one for supremacy rather than for markets. The Roman Empire was born of a Nietzschean will-to-power.

The wars of the early Middle Ages were largely fought for the purpose of extending feudal states. It is not until the social forces began the organization of modern nations that wars were fought primarily for commercial ends. And even then the economic motives outside of that of possession of more territory were often not paramount. Lords fought lords and kings fought kings to gain new territories and extend their power. The long wars between France and England increasingly involved economic conditions, but the dynastic claims were especially potent.

With the dawn of the era when new continents were to be pre-empted the motives of nations became increasingly economic. Possibilities of trade with India led to international struggles, while the enormous wealth of South American mines and the vast opportunities for colonization offered by North America became increasingly significant causes of the wars which all but wrecked Europe before and after that mad epoch known as the Thirty Years' War.

But it was not until the industrial age fairly opened in the eighteenth century and nations were forced to find new markets for their rapidly increasing products that economic policy became militaristic. Imperialistic motives, particularly in the development of Great Britain and acutely in the career of Napoleon, were present; but the new nations, though fighting like the ancient

cities for territory and subjects, increasingly sought for economic supremacy. Modern wars have been very largely economic. Some nation has possessed the supply of raw materials which another nation lacked, wanted, and determined to have to perfect the interests of its industrial development. Nations that would be commercial lacked harbors and struggled for access to the sea. The rapidly narrowing opportunity for colonization incited nations to fight other nations for the control of land as yet unappropriated by European states. Modern wars are born both of a desire for immediate expansion of territory and for the control of world-markets. The great nations which have harbors and colonies have been increasingly anxious for peace, while nations like Russia and Germany, which lacked one or the other, or both, maintained war as a part of the national policy. Commercial expansion was to be forced by arms. The German's demand for a place in the sun is traceable in no small degree to a belief that political supremacy is necessary for commercial expansion. To Germany, as to Assyria and Ghengis Kahn, war is not a thing to be avoided, but to be expected, planned for, and declared whenever time seems favorable. Germanic patriotism includes and justifies this fearful purpose.

In our modern world there exist two views regarding war as a phase of patriotism. The one set forth in the past by world-conquerors of Asia and Europe and today by the German publicists, philosophers, and statesmen; the other that set forth by France, Great Britain, and the United States. In measuring the moral values of these two

attitudes of mind it is not enough to say that the one is the expression of a growing state and the other the expression of a social mind of nations who have sufficient territory and commercial opportunity. The deeper question arises, Why, taking the world as it was shaped in the beginning of the twentieth century, was it necessary for one nation to expand at the expense of another? Granting, as we must, that economic expansion in the past has been justified by war and sanctified by religion, is there ground to argue that this must always be the case? In a modern world must commercial expansion be dependent upon military expansion, and must Christianity as a group attitude always leave the relations of nations to be settled by force? The history of Germany is the answer of the German philosophy of war. Leaders of German religious thought in published manifestoes have justified such an answer. True, the trade of Germany expanded enormously without appeal to military coercion. Its fleets were upon every sea, its merchants were in every port. There was no let or hindrance offered by any state to this expansion. Its trade with its rivals was enormous and was enriching all parties. The freedom of the seas was absolute. The passage of goods upon the land was unrestricted. If the history of the generation which made modern Europe shows anything it shows that governmental assistance to trade, with its consequent development, was independent of military forces. The war that broke out in 1914 had, it is true, economic motives, but it was not born of simple economic necessity. The trade of Germany would have been assured if there

had been no millions in arms. Deep, therefore, beneath the present world-conflict lie two different social philosophies and two conceptions of morality. On the one hand is the state philosophy which demands political control through military power and a religion that worships a German God of battles; on the other is the philosophy that seeks commercial development through the maintenance of peace, and an attempt, imperfect though it is, to apply Christian ideals to international relations.

Such a contrast, events have shown, involves not merely the policy of governments. It is the expression of the mind also of peoples. It embodies two conceptions of patriotism and religion. Germany, seeking commercial expansion through war, has trained its citizens—90 per cent of whom must always be subjects of a ruling tenth—to accept its philosophy and to identify national interests with militaristic policy. Democracies have trained their citizenship to a belief that the economic and the social welfare of a nation is to be reached through non-militaristic policies. If patriotism be a loyalty to a nation's ideals, we have, as has already been pointed out, two different qualities of patriotism, two different conceptions of the relation of religion to national policies.

## II

The champions of the militaristic patriotism are not without argument. They have the alleged law of biological necessity. They have the history of the past with its great empires of the East, of Alexander, and of Rome. If social evolution has within it no idealistic creative power, if humanity is to

be developed by rigorous determinism of inherited conditions and by the apotheosis of animal evolution, it is indeed hard to see why war is not to be inevitable and permanent.

The justification of war can use still other arguments. War certainly brings group solidarity, both for the group itself and for its individuals. The mere aggregation of numbers under a common discipline and for a common end has been of no small value. Practically all the modern nations have come into being through war. Humanity has always yielded to the enormous unifying power which lies in a socialized hatred. If you can get men to hate together they will act together. A nation's hatred reaches down into individuals, and every citizen finds himself possessed of a desire to injure those who have been declared to be the nation's enemies. Patriotism becomes a socialized hatred that unites as it maddens an entire people to fight for national goals.

Furthermore, we need no Bernhardt to point out that war has inspired nations to common sacrifice and to bravery in defense of what is regarded as a supremely important common good. One may even go farther and say that it is not impossible that war has stimulated moral attitudes. Few modern nations have entered war without an appeal to noble sentiments and the protestation of loyalty to noble ideals. Out from such an attitude of mind have come noble examples of individual and social sacrifice, and human hearts have been melted together by the fires of common agony. Our poetry is filled with war songs, and political leaders have very generally been soldiers.

But if war is thus not without its arguments, over against them must be others which modify the conclusions which have been drawn in favor of war. Not only does war plunge human life into abysmal misery—fathers and mothers weeping for their children and refusing to be comforted—out from the acute hatreds of war have come persistent hatreds which have perverted the relations of nations and have incalculably hindered the development of the finer things of life. Individualism has been lost in military organization; injury to nations and to individuals has been not only economic but moral; unworthy ambitions have been given new life; and social reforms have been obscured or abandoned because of military necessity. If it be true, as must be admitted, that out from war has come renewed confidence in immortality and in God, it must also be admitted that just as truly out from war has come a lowering of moral habits, the loss of momentum in social reform, a brutalizing of the thought of God, and a carelessness in the recognition of human rights.

How can those holding such divergent patriotisms profess the same religion?

In answering such a supreme question it is necessary first of all to look at facts rather than ideals. And the answer here is the same in the case of Christian as in that of non-Christian peoples. Christianity, like the religions of Assyria, Egypt, Judea, Greece, Rome, and Arabia, has been the servant and defender of war. Of course, such an answer is dependent upon our view as to what Christianity as an ideal religious system is. But such a Christianity never existed any more than the

Republic of Plato existed. In this sense is there truth in the cynical apothegm that Christianity has not failed, because it never has been true. Christianity as a historical phenomenon is the religion of Christians, an actual social phenomenon; the mass of experiences, thoughts, institutions, and teachings of a social group. It is not what it ought to be, but what it has been and is becoming. And this church-Christianity has never been the religion of Jesus. It has had the gospel about Jesus, but it has minimized the gospel of Jesus.

According to the authoritative formulas of Christian groups, religious faith consists in the acceptance of certain truths as expressed in creeds, confessions, and rites. Every ecclesiastical orthodoxy has been developed in large measure outside the area of morality. The Apostles' Creed, for example, has within it no reference to morality. It sets forth certain things about God, about Christ, about the church, about the forgiveness of sins, about the Second Coming of Christ, and about the world to come. There is in it no reference to human relations, the need of love, the sinfulness of injuring one's neighbor. So far as the Apostles' Creed, the foundation of all orthodoxy, is concerned, the Sermon on the Mount is nonexistent. The more elaborate creeds of the Catholic church, those of Nicea and Chalcedon, introduce morals no more than does the Apostles' Creed. The Athanasian Creed puts the matter sharply: to believe in the Trinity, in the two natures of the Christ, is to be saved; to doubt them is to be lost. Even the doctrine of original sin, as organized by Augustine and embodied in practically the whole mass of Christian



theology, gets its moral element from the sin of Adam, which has corrupted human nature so that every person is born not only sinful but damned. It is true that some are elected by God for his own good pleasure, from this *massa damnosa*, as the theologians called humanity, but this election is explicitly said to be wholly outside the region of human morality. Arminianism, it is true, recognizes that God's election is conditioned by his foreknowledge of men's faith, but this faith is still largely assent to metaphysical and eschatological propositions.

It is not difficult, therefore, to see why Christianity thus conceived has never included opposition to war. To it war is in an entirely different area from that of religion. Combatants can pray to God for victory, but their salvation from hell is not determined by any moral attitude of their own. Although a church may be a phase of international life, religion itself has not been primarily, if, indeed, secondarily, concerned with the application of the principles of Jesus to the activities of social groups. Men have fought for their faith, but their faith has not kept them from fighting.

It is no accident, therefore, that ecclesiastically orthodox Christians have waged war consistently and almost continuously. There was nothing in their operating religion really to prevent fighting. When men like Francis of Assisi undertook to apply the moral principles of Jesus to life, their efforts involved the taking of individuals out from the social group. With St. Francis, those who sought to reproduce within themselves the life of Christ did so by withdrawing from the world, taking on

the social attitude of beggary and the intermediate activity of charity.

A second interpretation of Christianity is the precise opposite of this ecclesiastical orthodoxy of other-worldliness. The followers of John Fox and Menno have emphasized mystical elements in religion, and in their morality have sought to produce an other-worldliness which, based upon certain of the teachings of Jesus regarding the state, elevated nonresistance to a moral imperative. The effect of such a view of Christianity as this has been to produce a quality of soul that is among our noblest inheritances. In the effort of the Society of Friends to follow the guidance of the Spirit we see a sincere and beautiful expression of the Christian spirit. They have endured the oppression of their enemies in the spirit of forgiveness, and they have given to the world noble lessons in peace of soul and simple faith in a God who is not far away, but present in the believer's heart.

Such an attitude of mind has always been hostile to war. The Quaker has consistently followed his conscience and the inner light in refusing to participate in war, though he has not refused to be a good citizen, and during war he has not hesitated to endure danger in the service of his fellows.

On March 29, 1918, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Friends issued this noteworthy statement:

The basis of our opposition to war is much more than any single command of the Old or the New Testament. It is our faith that the way of love by which our Master, Jesus Christ, met and conquered evil remains for His followers today the true method of combating wrong. For us,

as for Him, this involves refusal to use means which, like war, violate love and defeat its ends; but it does not mean a weak neutrality toward evil. For us, as for Him, it means a life of action devoted to the heroic purpose of overcoming evil with good. The unspeakable sufferings of humanity are now calling us and all men to larger sacrifices and more earnest endeavors to put this faith into practice. To such endeavors we dedicate ourselves.

In accordance with this faith, we desire to maintain all our relationships today.

To our beloved country, we affirm the deep loyalty of grateful hearts. We long to help her realize her noblest capacities as a great Republic dedicated to liberty and democracy. But we believe that we best serve our country and all humanity when we maintain that religion and conscience are superior even to the state.

To President Wilson, we declare our appreciation of his steadfast and courageous efforts to keep the aims of the United States in this great conflict liberal, disinterested, and righteous.

To our fellow-countrymen, who are following the leadings of conscience into ways where we cannot be their comrades, we give assurance of respect and sympathy in all that they endure. Finally,

For all men, whether they be called our enemies or not, we pray that the sacrificial love of Christ, stirring us to repentance, may reconcile and unite all mankind in the brotherhood of His spirit.

If the religion of the Quakers had become the religion of the world, war would have ceased. But it has not become the religion of the world or even of an appreciable section of the world. Personally I believe it is in its moral idealism nearer the spirit of Jesus than is ecclesiastical orthodoxy, but the question that confronts us is not one of ideals or theories but of actual social attitudes

and tendencies. Whatever may be our individual convictions, in the realm of actual conduct we are dealing with organized social groups controlled by socialized passions, convictions, and principles of conduct.

### III

The pacifist claims that war is un-Christian and that he is the true representative of Christianity. Because of this belief he refuses to engage in the present war, undertakes to oppose preparation for war, often attempts to induce men to avoid draft, and attacks all forms of military preparation for the purpose of national defense.

Speaking generally, this pacifism, other than Quaker or Mennonite, takes two forms. There is first that of those who do not believe in human progress and who hold tenaciously and sometimes joyously to the belief that the world is growing worse. They reproduce the early Christian expectation of the speedy return of Jesus from heaven and the imminent end of the world, and consistently urge that the true Christian awaits a great cataclysm due to the intervention of supernatural and miraculous persons. Why then fight? Periods of war have always given rise to some form of this belief in supernatural intervention, and at the present time the churches of America are dangerously full of this expectation. To an extent unbelievable by those who are out of touch with the situation religious leaders are going about the country announcing the approaching end of the world and calling upon people to await the millenium and the day of judgment. Prophetic conferences are being held in the

larger cities, and throughout the country districts itinerant evangelists are foretelling the imminent return of Jesus from the heavens. The motives of these evangelists undoubtedly vary. Some are certainly sincere in their naïve centering of Christianity upon the Second Coming of Christ. Others are so hostile to the present policies of the government as to have been subject to investigation on the part of the federal government. But whatever may be the particular type of doctrine, the common element in all such beliefs is that history contains no hope and must come to an end. Fantastic expositions of Scripture find in the Book of Revelation the number of the Kaiser, identify him with the anti-Christ, discover prophecies of tanks in the Prophets and dates when the war will end in Daniel and the Revelation, urge the church to await the miraculous disappearance of saints into heavenly "rapture," foretell a period of misery in which forces of evil are to be for a time triumphant, although in the end they are to be conquered by Christ and the angels.

Evidence is at hand to show that the effect of such teaching is in many cases a refusal on the part of its followers to share in national burdens, either of military service or of financial support of the government, or even in the work of the Red Cross. Its champions, whether intentionally or not, are disloyal, because they sap the springs of national courage and make unintelligible prophesying superior to devotion to national well-being.

The other type of pacifism is of a higher character. It looks to no miraculous end of the world, but rather to the

operation of nonresistance not unlike that of the Society of Friends or the Mennonites. Its champions, however, as a rule do not belong to either society. Few of them are orthodox, many of them are radical in their theology. Like Tolstoi, they are dominated by a conception of Christianity gained by neglecting the historical inheritances in our religion and by generalizing certain of the sayings of Jesus, like "resist not evil." The position which these pacifists take is in effect that the refusal on the part of a nation to defend itself against the aggression of a nation would tend to mitigate that other nation's aggressiveness and shame it into peace. They recall Christ's words about turning the other cheek, but overlook the social philosophy involved in his saying that those who take the sword shall perish by the sword. A distinguished representative of this point of view was recently asked as to how it could be harmonized with the treatment accorded by the Germans to Russia after the refusal of the Bolsheviks to engage further in war. Her answer was in effect that if the propaganda of the Bolsheviks had not been checked among the German soldiers, peace would have come.

Far be it from me to question the moral sincerity of these high-minded but unpractical souls. But sincerity is not synonymous with wisdom. Good people frequently lack good sense. The difficulty with these particular good people is twofold: in the first place they overestimate the power of moral ideals to determine the action of a nation that, like Germany, has organized itself for war and has justified itself by an un-Christian philosophy in its pursuance of

war as a means of national development; and in the second place they have an abstract view of morality. To them ideals exist apart from concrete human experience. The actual forces of social evolution are neglected and moral imperatives are judged with no regard to the progress and impulses of men who are subject to the forces of social evolution. And this amounts to a misinterpretation of Christianity itself.

Christianity as a religion is not to be described by making an anthology of the words of Jesus. It is the actual reaction of individuals and groups to these ideals. Christianity is a social movement partly expressed and partly not expressed by the churches. Its center is not to be found in this or that apothegm of Jesus, but in the spiritual sympathies and tendencies of social groups. The moral values which go to make up the ideals of these groups are never absolute but always relative. The present issue is not between nations equally ready to be shown the way to giving justice, but between nations one group of which is following Caesar and the other of which is defending institutions embodying a developing appreciation of the ideals which Jesus set forth.

The fundamental principle of Jesus is love, not the particular application made of this love to the duties of those preaching love. The sayings of Jesus dealing with nonresistance were never brought into the political field. They were intended by him to direct the action of his followers in putting the principle of love into operation. When his disciples went forth to preach the triumph of human brotherhood they would be setting forth ideals which interfered

with certain privileges and customs and institutions of the world in which they lived. They would undoubtedly meet with persecution. They were not to undertake to convert men to love by appeal to force, nor were they to seek to revenge themselves upon their persecutors. All this is beyond question the true attitude of the Christian. You cannot make men brotherly by terrorization, neither can you spread the principle of love by hatred and vengeance.

Even in the larger field of national life this is true. The enforced Christianization of heathen tribes, like that of the Saxons of Charlemagne and the Prussians by the Teutonic knights, has not served to develop the moral impulses that have sprung from the work of modern foreign missions. A complete appraisal of German Christianity cannot overlook the effect of the brutality that attended the conversion of the tribes that have united in the German people.

Back of any specific application is the principle of love itself. Love is a way of treating other people. It is not a formula but a concrete morality. In the case of individuals it involves much more than good nature or submission to injustice. We recognize this in civil affairs, and laws are a more or less successful attempt to organize social action in accord with the principle formulated by Kant: "Act so as to use humanity whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end, never as a means." Obviously the moral problems set a community that endeavors to put the principle of brotherhood into operation are vastly more complicated than the pacifist chooses to see. The development of civilization

proceeds gradually, by the embodiment of ideals in human institutions. These institutions which guarantee personal liberty, the right of initiative, democracy in the sense of a people's right to control its own affairs, exist as an exceedingly precious heritage for succeeding generations. They must be preserved if humanity is to be preserved. To submit passively to their destruction is a violation of the fundamental principle of brotherhood. Society recognizes this clearly enough in its attempt to protect itself from evil-minded men, like thieves, adulterers, and oppressors of their kind. The decision as to whether a citizen shall undertake such protection is not the question of individual likes and dislikes but of social obligation. The fact that as human society grows more responsive to ideals of justice and fraternity the protection of these institutions of human welfare becomes increasingly conventional and so less in need of reliance upon force serves only to obscure the fundamental necessity of a society's being able to offer protection to its members and successors if institutions born of justice are endangered. A refusal to undertake the duty of guaranteeing such protection, whatever may be its alleged ethical justification, is in reality an antifraternel act. While we must oppose every illegitimate appeal to force, all unintelligent treatment of criminals, the hideousness of mob violence, and the excesses of punitive justice, the basic fact still remains: love must protect institutions which embody and preserve its own progress. When a nation that despises love as effeminacy and honors the "will to power" attacks those institutions there

is only one duty before nations who love peace. They must exhaust all efforts to settle international difficulties by arbitration and moral appeal; but if these fail they must protect justice and liberty by force. To do otherwise would be disloyalty to the heritage of justice and liberty.

If we would apply the teaching of Jesus to national action we must hold fast to the principle of good neighborliness. It is not always safe to build hypotheses around a parable, but at least it is as legitimate as are some interpretations to which the parables have been subjected. But let us suppose the Good Samaritan had arrived while the robbers were attacking their victim. What should he have done to merit the approval of Jesus? In the first place, he might have done nothing. His interest might have been highly scientific. He might have watched the technique of the robbers, the way in which they stripped their victim, the way in which they disappeared. If he had been thoroughly modern he might then have made a study of their thumb marks so as to be able to identify the perpetrators of similar robberies in the future. Then after he had taken the necessary notes he might have cared for the wounded. Can anyone hold that this would be an application of the principle of neighborliness? Would scientific interest in robbery justify a refusal to defend the robbed?

Or the Good Samaritan, when he came upon the traveler struggling with the robbers, might have said to himself, "Here is a providential opportunity to recoup myself from various losses in business." And so he might have taken

the traveler's baggage and the robbers' baggage and gone on his way to Jericho. Would Jesus have told the lawyer to go and do likewise?

Or he might have said, "This is a moment to call a conference which shall vote measures that shall so police the road from Jerusalem to Jericho that there shall be no robbers." Would such action, necessary as it might be at other times, have been the true expression of neighborliness?

Or the Good Samaritan might have said, "This is certainly a sad occasion, but my obligation as a Good Samaritan is one of amelioration. I will therefore find a shady place where I may wait until the robbers finish their work, and then I shall be ready to care for the wounded man and perform the other duties which are expected of Good Samaritans." Can any sane man think that Jesus would have advised such conduct? Would not the very principle of love and desire to help a man in sorrow, the very spirit of Calvary itself, have induced this man to help the unfortunate traveler defend himself?

Let us get this principle of sacrificial social-mindedness clear. Once grasped the method in which it is expressed is a matter of intelligence. Love is not to be limited to Red Cross service. Such sacrificial social-mindedness as the Good Samaritan might have exhibited is not militarism. Just how far we should interfere in other people's quarrels, how far we should use our resources to protect the defenseless, how far we should undertake to erect proper social defenses which would make good Samaritans unnecessary must be left to the wisdom which our trained experts may show us.

But no man is a Christian who believes that anything injurious is right. No man has the spirit of Christ who is content to permit wrong to live quietly.

Personal comfort, life itself, is as nothing compared with the giving of justice, for which Jesus himself died. So in the case of a nation that sees the world and itself attacked by another nation bent upon terrorizing its neighbors and the destruction of the most precious institutions of civilization. Pacifism under such circumstances is misguided idealism if not transcendentalized selfishness. The duty which a nation owes to its world as well as to itself and its future compels it to protect its institutions and its very existence against the assault of a national highwayman.

That is the real spirit with which Christians must approach the question of war. War born of a perverted patriotism, war for the sake of national aggrandizement at the expense of other nations, is un-Christian, no matter how much it may be camouflaged under appeals to the God of Gideon and of David. The very essence of a Christian patriotism is the defense, not of national institutions as such, but of institutions which are potentially if not actually Christian. Love, which is the heart of the Christian message, cannot permit a nation or an individual to remain passive while the well-being of others is endangered. The highest sacrifice which love demands is a frank recognition of the necessity of abandoning the ideals of peace because peace involves sufferings to others. The true Christian patriot at the present time is in fact

saying to certain ideals, "You must for the moment retire from the scene. I have a desperately nasty mess to clean up. I am not responsible for the situation, but it is a choice between defending institutions which guarantee your existence or permitting those institutions to go down to destruction." And my own conviction is clear that such self-sacrifice in the interest of making permanent the achievement of ideals is the most idealistic service a man or a nation can render the world.

#### IV

Ideals work when they draw men to themselves. But such approach is registered not in abstract theories, but in social accomplishment. To protect such accomplishment in the interest of the still more complete embodiment of ideals is loyalty, not only to a nation but to one's religion. In such a situation a moral patriotism looks to religion not like a monarch who seeks to exploit God in order to justify his own ambition. Rather does it seek inspiration for a service which gets its value, not merely from loyalty to a nation, but from a

loyalty to a nation self-consecrated to humanity. It is this sort of patriotism that we dare call Christian. "We hope," a well-intended body of Christians once said to Mr. Lincoln, "that God is on our side." "I am not much concerned," said Mr. Lincoln, "to know whether God is on our side. What I want to know is whether we are on God's side." With this desire that American patriotism may now face its terrible task, we pray for the victory of our arms, not because we demand that God shall give victory to our country whether we are right or wrong, but because we are convinced that the cause for which we struggle is more precious than a peace bought at the expense of the world's welfare; that the cause for which we fight is God's cause as we know it, revealed both in the life and ideals of Jesus and in the unmistakable tendencies of social evolution.

A religion which will keep its followers from committing themselves to the direction of such patriotism is either too aesthetic for humanity's actual needs, too individualistic to be social, or too disloyal to be tolerated.